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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
PlaintiffPetitioner,
v.
CURTIS W. COLLINS,
Defendant/Respondent.

:

Case No. 20010371-CA

:

RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING
On July 26,2002, this Court issued a unanimous decision in State v. Collins, 2002 UT
App 253, 452 Utah Adv. Rep. 41 {Addendum), which opinion affirmed the trial court's
denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence. Defendant timely filed a petition for
rehearing. Pursuant to this Court's Order dated August 22,2002, the State now responds.1
ARGUMENT
(1) THIS COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED ALL RELEVANT AND
MATERIAL FACTS
Defendant first claims that this Court improperly considered facts which were not
before the trial court and overlooked a fact presented to the trial court. See Defendant's
Petition for Rehearing [Pet Reft./ at 2-3. Defendant is incorrect.
1

Defendant's petition does not contain a good faith certification as required by
rule 35(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Nevertheless, the State responds pursuant
to this Court's Order.

Defendant asserts that paragraph 4 of the Collins opinion improperly relies on facts
which were not before the trial court when it considered defendant's motion to suppress. Id,
The challenged portion reads:
Upon arriving at Logan Regional Hospital, Deputy Yeates did a "complete patdown search of Mr. Collins" during the admission process. During the searc h,
Deputy Yeates found a knife sheath under clothing in Defendant's crotch area.
Deputy Yeates looked inside the sheath and then, upon seeing a "small plastic
baggy with a yellowish white powder," handed it to Officer Baty.
Collins, 2002 UT App 253, f 4. The paragraph is substantively almost identical to the
statement of facts contained in defendant's memorandum filed in support of his motion to
suppress. Defendant's statement of facts reads:
In the Mental Health Unit [of the Logan Regional Hospital], "Chief Deputy
Yeates did a complete pat down search of Mr. Collins." Chief Deputy Yeates
removed the Defendant's walletfromhis back pocket and a knife sheath from
inside the front of his pants and gave them to Officer Baty
Officer Baty
also opened the knife sheath and found a small baggy with a white powdery
substance inside.
(R. 40-41). The only substantive difference between paragraph 4 and defendant's statement
is the identity of the officer who opened the knife sheath. Identification of which officer first
opened the knife sheath is not necessary, however, to resolve the Fourth Amendment issue.
Instead, the dispositive fact is that a police officer conducted the challenged search. See
State v.Ellingsworth, 966P.2d 1220,1222-23 (Utah App. 1998) (recognizingthatthe Fourth
Amendment applies to law enforcement searches, but only extends to non-law enforcement
searches when done for no other purpose than to aid the government's investigatory
function), cert denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999).

2

Here, the State never disputed that a police officer conducted the search, but
recognized that it was unclear which officer opened the knife sheath. See Brief of Appellee
[Br.Aplee.J at 6 ("The knife sheath was opened by Bates and/or Yeates (R. 69: 16-17, 20,
25).")- This Court likewise recognized that while "[tjhere [was] some question as to whether
Yeates was acting as a peace officer or as a private citizen [i.e., medical EMT] . . . [the
Court] assume[s] Yeates was acting as a peace officer because this is how the parties argued
the case to the trial court and on appeal."

Collins, 20002 UT App 253, ^ 4 n.2.

Consequently, Collins is correctly predicated on the salient facts: the search was policeconducted (regardless of which officer conducted it) and, thus, subject to Fourth Amendment
constrictions.
Defendant nevertheless argues that paragraph 4 is inaccurate because it relies, in part,
on the preliminary hearing testimony. See PetReh. at 2. According to defendant, the trial
judge, who was also the preliminary hearing magistrate, only considered the facts contained
in defendant's memorandum in support of his motion to suppress. Id. See also Brief of
Appellant [Br.Aplt] at 8 n.2 & Reply Brief of Appellant [Reply Br.] at 5. The State
disputed defendant's contention, not only because it was unrealistic to think that the judge
would disregard evidence he heard in the preliminary hearing, but additionally, because the
full record facts may be considered in affirming a lower court's denial of a motion to
suppress. See Br.Aplee. at 3 n.3.
In any case, this Court need not resolve the record dispute. For even if defendant were
correct that the preliminary hearing testimony could not or was not considered by the trial
3

court, the outcome of defendant's appeal is the same: the search is legal because a police
officer may statutorily and constitutionally search a mental detainee incident to his civil
commitment. See Collins, 2002 UT App 253, f 11. To obviate defendant's concerns,
however, paragraph 4 could easily be altered to read:
Upon arriving at Logan Regional Hospital, Deputy Yeates did a "complete patdown search of Mr. Collins" during the admission process. During the search,
Deputy Yeates found a knife sheath under clothing in Defendant's crotch area.
A police officer looked inside the sheath and saw a "small plastic baggy with
a yellowish white powder."
(emphasized words added and some original words deleted). Substituting the generic term
"police officer" for a named officer renders paragraph 4 consistent with both parties' views
of the evidence and, at the same time, does not change the substance of the Collins opinion.
Defendant next alleges that this Court failed to consider that defendant was briefly
frisked by officers prior to being transported by the ambulance crew to the Logan hospital.
See PetReh. at 3. Again, the fact that afriskoccurred was not disputed. See Br.Aplee. at
5. Nor was it overlooked by this Court:
Prior to entering [the emergency room], [the responding officers] "checked
[Defendant] for weapons" by doing "an outside pat-down . . . of his pockets"
and boots,
Collins, 2002 UT App 253, f 4. The Court's statement accurately reflects the trial court's
uncontested finding:
The officers took the Defendant into custody and walked him across the
parking lot to the emergency room. At this point the officers apparently
conducted a search of the Defendant and found several items in the
Defendant's boots, but a knife sheath in his pants was undetected.
4

(R. 49-50).
In sum, defendant's claim that this Court overlooked or improperly considered facts
is without merit. Collins' factual foundation is sound.
(2) THIS COURT CORRECTLY
CONCESSION BELOW

INTERPRETED

COUNSELS

Defendant claims that this Court incorrectly interpreted his counsel's statements
during the motion to suppress to be a concession that his civil detention was legal. See
Pet.Reh. at 3, Again, defendant's argument is without merit.
In moving to suppress, defendant claimed that he could not be searched absent a
search warrant unless an exception to the Fourth Amendment applied (R. 37). In his
accompanying memorandum, defendant admitted that he "had been delivered to the Mental
Heath Unit under the authority of a 'Certificate for Commitment to the Local Mental Health
Authority Emergency Procedure'" (R. 39). Neither the motion nor memorandum challenged
the validity of the civil commitment.
To the contrary, the fact that defendant was lawfully detained under a civil
commitment order was the basis of defendant's argument that no traditional Fourth
Amendment exceptions - such as search incident to arrest - applied. When the prosecutor
attempted to analogize the mental detainee procedure to an arrest, defense counsel protested
that he was solely under a civil commitment authorized under UTAH CODE ANN. § 62(a)-12232 (1997) (R. 70: 2-3). Defense counsel continued:

5

Yeah, that's what it is, is a civil commitment. [UTAH CODE ANN. §] 77^7-2
[1999], an arrest by a peace officer requires that there be a warrant except for
public offense committed or attempted in the presence the peace officer, et
cetera.
I think it's obvious that if the Brigham City police, or for the matter the
county sheriff, arrested this gentleman, that it was without a warrant and there
was no public offense committed, period. It wasn't a public offense, it was a
civil commitment. They had the obligation to transport, I agree with that.
(R.70: 4). Defense counsel stated:
When [the police] took Mr. Collinsfromthe Bear River Mental Health to the
Brigham City emergency room initially, they looked for weapons. They did a
search. That's part of the facts. The Brigham City police did a search.
(R. 70: 5). The trial court asked if the police had authority to conduct the initial frisk and
defense counsel responded:
I think - I'm not sure they did have authority for that search, but that's not
what I'm questioning here. I'm not questioning that particular search. I
suppose that they have authority maybe based on the theories of the Terry stop
and the Terry custody things. Initially they have arightto see that there's no
weapons, to see that there's no danger. That may be the exigent circumstances
that allows that to do it initially. And that happened here. I don't have any
particular problem with that.
But then, after that took place - and if there was an arrest, which I don't
believe there was, but that was the point of the arrest, the Brigham City police.
If there was a search incident to arrest that would have had to be it. The search
- and then the sheriffs department gets involved and the ambulance crew
takes him to Logan and delivers him to the mental health unit.
Now, what I would say there is the mental health unit has an obligation
to do the search if there's one to be done at that point.
(R. 70: 5-6). Minutes later, defense counsel again stated:
Mr. Collins was in the custody of the mental health unit in Logan at the time
because that's where he's been delivered to. . . . I don't believe it was an
arrest. I believe that clearly the statute that allows transport makes it not an
arrest. It's a civil commitment.

6

(R. 70: 7).
In sum, as this Court correctly concluded, counsel's statements constituted a
concession that his civil detention was legal. See Collins, 2002 UT App 253, f 9. But even
if not characterized as a concession, counsel's statements below waived his right to challenge
the legality of his detention on appeal. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, \ 11,10 P.3d 346
(reaffirming that an appellant may not raise legal or factual issues for the first time on
appeal); CityofOrem v. Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384,1387-88 (Utah App. 1994(recognizing that
an appellant may not circumvent on appeal his statements below). Consequently, the issue
properly was not addressed in Collins.
(3) THIS COURT PROPERLY DID NOT CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S
PLAIN ERROR ARGUMENT RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN HIS
REPLY BRIEF
Defendant's final complaint is that this Court did not address the validity of his civil
commitment under the plain error or exceptional circumstances exception to the preservation
rule. See PetReh. at 3. The complaint is without merit.
In his opening brief, defendant claimed he preserved a challenge to the validity of his
civil commitment. See Br.Aplt at 6, 11, 15-16. The State responded that defendant had
conceded that issue below. See discussion, supra at 5-7. For the first time in his reply brief,
defendant asserted that, even ifnot preserved, this Court should nevertheless review the issue
for the first time on appeal under the plain error/exceptional circumstances doctrines.
It is well-established that an appellant may not raise a plain error claim for the first
time in his reply brief. See Premier Van Schaack Realty v. Sieg, 2002 UT App 173,1 10
7

n. 1, 51 P.3d 24. See also UTAH R. APP. P. 24(c). This Court, therefore, did not consider the
merits of defendant's unpreserved and improperly raised argument.
Moreover, because defense counsel conceded the validity of his civil detention, any
alleged "plain error" would necessarily also be "invited error." It is well-established that
invited error precludes plain error review. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^ 31, 12
P.3d 92; State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337,343 (Utah 1997). Consequently, this Court, having
concluded that defense counsel conceded the issue, see discussion, supra at 5-7, properly
declined to consider it on appeal.
Similarly, contrary to defendant's claim, see PetReh. at 4, this Court should not now
consider rule 20 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which rule provides that the
absence of an objection will not prejudice a party if the party had no opportunity to object
to the ruling. Defendant cites rule 20 for the first time in his petition for rehearing, therefore,
it is not properly raised. Cf. Premier Van Schaack Realty, 2002 UT App 173, f 10.
Moreover, rule 20, like plain error, is simply an exception to the preservation rule. Here, no
exception applies because defendant did more than fail to preserve the issue, he conceded it.
See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 31; Brown, 948 P.2d at 343. And, in any case, rule 20 is
inapplicable because, as this Court concluded, defendant had an opportunity to object to the
lower court's procedures, but did not do so. See Collins, 2002 UT App 253, f 10.
In sum, Collins properly declined to address defendant's plain error argument.

8

CONCLUSION
This Court should deny defendant's petition for rehearing.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this °<Mh day of September, 2002.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney Genera
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Response in
Opposition to Petition for Rehearing were mailed, postage prepaid, to JACK H. MOLGARD,
attorney for defendant/petitioner, 102 South 100 West, P.O. Box 461, Brigham City, UT
84302, this <Uh day of September, 2002.
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Addendum

2002 WL P2^83 I
— P.3d —
(Cite as: 2002 \VL 1726831 (Utah App.))
H
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN
RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE
PERMANENT
LAW
REPORTS.
UNTIL
RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR
WITHDRAWAL.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Curtis W. COLLINS, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20010371-CA.
July 26, 2002.
Defendant
charged
with
possession
of
methamphetamine moved to suppress evidence
obtained from search conducted when defendant was
taken into protective custody. The First District
Court, Brigham City Department, Ben H. Hadfield,
J., denied the motion and defendant brought
interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals, Bench,
J., held that: (1) defendant failed to preserve for
appellate review claim that he had no notice trial
court would imply warrant exception in temporary,
involuntary commitment statute; (2) warrantless
searches of defendant being taken into protective
custody did not violate Fourth Amendment; and (3)
scope of warrantless search of person being taken
into potestative custody is not limited to simple
weapons pat-down.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes
[1] Criminal Law 491137(1)
llOkl137(1)
Issue of whether statutory procedure for temporary,
involuntary commitment was complied with could
not be raised on appeal of narcotics prosecution
where defendant conceded in trial court that his
detention was legal. U.C.A. 1953, 62A-12-232.
[2] Criminal Law <®=> 1031(1)
U0kl031(l)
Defendant charged with possession of controlled
Copr. © West 2002 No (

Page I

substance failed to preserve for appellate review
claim that he had no notice trial court would imply
warrant exception in temporary, involuntary
commitment statute or would rely on emergency
circumstances exception to- justify search of
defendant taken into protective custody; although
court raised issue of cases involving similar searches
prior to commitment to mental health facility and
expressed intention to take matter under advisement
and find authority on point, defendant failed to
object to court's procedure.
U.S.C.A. Const.
Amend. 4.; U.C.A. 1953, 62A-12-232.
[3] Searches and Seizures <®^39
349k39
Warrantless searches of defendant's person incident
to his commitment to mental health facility under
temporary, involuntary commitment statute did not
violate Fourth Amendment
U.S.C.A. Const.
Amend. 4; U.C.A. 1953, 62A-12-232.
[4] Searches and Seizures <®=»39
349k39
Search incident to protective custody, just as search
incident to lawful arrest, is allowed under
Constitution. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 4.
[5] Mental Health <®=»40
257Ak40
Requirements
of
temporary,
involuntary
commitment statute were met before police officer
took defendant into protective custody where
defendant's doctor and other witnesses were
concerned for their own and defendant's safety and
defendant was acting in manner that could have
easily led to serious injury of himself or others.
U.C.A. 1953, 62A-12-231 to 62A-12-232.
[6] Searches and Seizures <®=?185
349kl85
There is implied authorization to conduct search
incident to taking individual into custody pursuant to
temporary, voluntary commitment statute; without
such implied authorization to conduct search, peace
officer could not effectuate legislative intent of
preserving safety of public or individual being taken
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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(Cite as 2002 WL 1726831 (Itah App.))
into custody U S C A Const Amend 4 , U C A
1953, 62A-12-231 to 62A-12-232
[7] Searches and Seizures <@=>39
349k39
Just as search incident to lawful arrest is
constitutionally permissible, so too is search incident
to being taken into protective custody; core inquiry
in Fourth Amendment analysis is whether person
has reasonable expectation of privacy in area
searched and person being placed in civil protective
custody can expect to be searched same as
individual who is placed in criminal arrest custody.
U S C A Const Amend 4.
[8] Searches and Seizures <S=>39
349k39
Statutorily authorized search for persons being taken
into protective custody is not limited in scope to
simple weapons pat-down; purpose of civil
protective custody search is to protect not only
peace officer, but also mentally ill individual and
others. U S C A. Const. Amend. 4; U C.A. 1953,
62A-12-231to62A-12-232.
Jack H. Molgard, Molgard & Hunsaker, Bngham
City, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General, Christine
Solus, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee.
Before Judges
BENCH

JACKSON,

BILLINGS,

to the trial court s tindings trom the suppression
hearing' ' State v Giron, 943 P 2d 1114, 1115
(Utah Ct App 1997) (citation omitted)
1| 3 Defendant went with his mother for a scheduled
appointment with Dr William Weber at Bear River
Mental Health in Bngham City During the
appointment, Defendant "gradually levved up,
demonstrating confusion [and] inability to control
his repetitive and threatening behavior" and
contmued to become more violent and irrational
Fearing for their safety, Defendant's mother and
clinic staff locked the building's doors when
Defendant eventually wandered outside Defendant
then began yelling and pounding on the glass doors
Dr Weber felt that Defendant was off his
medication and needed to be hospitalized so he
called the Bngham City Police. The responding
officers spoke with the doctor, caseworkers, and
Defendant's mother, and received a "Certificate for
Commitment to the Local Mental Health Authority
Emergency Procedure." The Certificate was signed
by Dr. Weber who had examined Defendant and
concluded that he was "mentally ill and, because of
his mental illness, [was] likely to injure himself or
others if not immediately restrained." Utah Code
Ann. § 62A-12-232(i)(a)(ii) (2000). [FN1] Pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. §§ 62A-12-231 to 232 (2000),
the officers took Defendant into custody for
transport to Logan Regional Hospital where
Defendant could be temporarily and involuntarily
held.

and

OPINION
BENCH, Judge:
*1 f 1 This is an interlocutory appeal by Defendant,
Curtis Collins, from an order denying his motion to
suppress evidence obtained from a search conducted
when Defendant was taken into protective custody
during involuntary commitment into a mental health
umt Defendant is charged with possession of a
controlled substance, methamphetamine, a second
degree felony We affirm the trial court's demal of
the motion to suppress

BACKGROUND
H 2 "We recite the facts in the 'light most favorable

t 4 The officers escorted Defendant to the mental
health facility's emergency room. Pnor to entermg,
they "checked [Defendant] for weapons" by domg
"an outside pat-down .. of his pockets" and boots
After medication was given to Defendant to calm
him down, the officers turned Defendant over to an
ambulance crew and Officer J. Baty for transport to
Logan Regional Hospital
Lynn Yeates, an
emergency medical technician (EMT), was pan of
the ambulance crew. [FN2] Upon arming at Logan
Regional Hospital, Deputy Yeates did a "complete
pat- down search of Mr. Collins" during the
admission process. During the search, Deputy
Yeates found a knife sheath under clothing in
Defendant's crotch area. Deputy Yeates looked
inside the sheath and then, upon seeing a "small
plastic baggy with a yellowish white powder/'
handed it to Officer Baty In addition to the baggy
and white powder, Officer Baty also found a straw

Copr e West 2002 No Claim to Ong U S Govt. Works
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2002 WL 1"26831
(Cite as: 2002 VV L 1726831, *1 (Utah App.))
and several pieces of foil that had a burnt substance
on it. Further testing of the knife sheath and the
powdery substance confirmed the presence of
methamphetamine.

however, we review for correctness." State v.
Navanick, 1999 UT App 265,H 7, 987 P.2d 1276
(citations omitted); see also State v. Anderson, 910
P.2d 1229, 1232 (Utah 1996).

*2 % 5 Defendant was charged with possession of a
controlled substance, a second degree felony.
Following his preliminary hearing, Defendant filed a
Motion to Suppress the evidence discovered in the
warrantless search of Defendant's person by Yeates
and Baty. The trial court denied this motion,
concluding that (1) there is an implied authorization
to conduct a search incident to taking an individual
into custody pursuant to sections 62A-12- 231 to
-232; or, in the alternative, (2) the officers were
engaged in a "valid community caretaking role" so
any searches came within the "emergency
circumstances"
exception
to
the
warrant
requirement. This court granted Defendant's petition
for an interlocutory appeal to review the denial of
his Motion to Suppress evidence obtained from the
warrantless searches. See State v. Koury, 824 P.2d
474, 476 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

ANALYSIS

ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
H 6 The central issue before us is whether a
protective custody search is allowed under the
Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures. First, Defendant argues that
"the warrantless searches of Defendant's person and
his belongings were in violation of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States constitution and
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution."
[FN3] Second, Defendant argues that Utah Code
Ann. § 62A- 12-232(l)(a)(i) was not complied with
when Defendant was taken into custody and that
sections 62A-12-231 to -232 do not create an
implied exception to the warrant requirement.
Finally, Defendant argues that the searches do not
fall within the "emergency circumstances" or
"community caretaker" exceptions to the warrant
requirement. Defendant claims that there art no
facts on which to base the emergency circumstance
or community caretaker exceptions, because the
searches were primarily motivated by intent to arrest
and seize evidence.
K 7 " 'In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a
motion to suppress evidence, we will not overturn
the trial court's factual findings absent clear
error....' The trial court's legal conclusions,
Copr. © West 2002 No Claim

%S Section 62A-12-232 provides, in relevant part:
(l)(a) An adult may be temporarily, involuntarily
committed to a local mental health authority upon:
(i) written application by a responsible person who
has reason to know, stating a belief that the
individual is likely to cause serious injury to
himself or others if not immediately restrained,
and stating the personal knowledge of the
individual's condition or circumstances which lead
to that belief; and
(ii) a certification by a licensed physician ...
stating that the physician ... has examined the
individual ..., and that he is of the opinion that the
individual is mentally ill and, because of his
mental illness, is likely to injure himself or others
if not immediately restrained.
*3 (b) Application and certification as described in
Subsection (l)(a) authorizes any peace officer to
take the individual into the custody of a local
mental health authority and transport the individual
to that authority's designated facility.
(4) Transportation of mentally ill persons pursuant
to Subsections (1) ... shall be conducted by die
appropriate municipal, or city or town, law
enforcement authority or, under the appropriate
law enforcement's authority, by ambulance....
Id. (emphasis added).
[1] % 9 On appeal, Defendant argues that section
62A-12-232(l)(aX0 was not complied with.
However, Defendant cannot raise this argument on
appeal, after having conceded in the trial court that
his detention was legal. Defendant's attorney
expressly stated, "They [meaning the police] had the
obligation to transport, I agree with that." The
defense cannot now "circumvent its earlier
concession." City of Orem v. Henrie, 868 P. 2d
1384, 1387 (Utah Ct.App. 1994). " '[A]n appellate
court normally will not consider issues, even
constitutional ones, that have not been presented
first to the trial court for its consideration and
resolution.' " Id. (alteration in original) (citation
omitted). We therefore decline to address this issue
for the first time on appeal. See id.
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

:uo2 \\L r>*<
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(Cite as: 2002 \\ L 1726831. *3 (Ltah \pp.))
[2] H 10 Additionally, Detendant argues for the first
time on appeal that Defendant's due process rights
were denied because the trial court's memorandum
decision "advanced new theories of which the
Defendant neither had notice or
opportunity to
address ' Defendant claims that he had no notice
that the lower court would imply a warrant
exception in section 62A-12-232 or that, in the
alternative, the court would base its decision on the
emergency circumstances exception. Defendant
therefore contends that he 'was not in a position to
object to the trial court's desire to take the motion
under advisement and do independent research."
Our reading of the record does not support
Defendant's contention. At the motion hearing, the
judge stated that "[sjurely there's been other cases
where in the process of a [civil commitment] to a
mental health facility either weapons or contraband
. . was discovered " In response, Defendant's
attorney replied, "I've looked and I didn't see
anything in regard to that." The court then told both
parties that it would take the matter under
advisement to "find some authority that's on point."
The defense did not object to the court's procedure
at this point and failed to object in the trial court
thereafter. We therefore decline to address this
issue. See State v. Holgcue, 2000 UT 74,f 11, 10
P 3d 346 ("As a general rule, claims not raised
before the trial court may not be raised on appeal.").
[3][4] H 11 Defendant also argues that the
warrantless searches of his person were conducted
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Defendant
contends that the tnal court erred in finding an
implied exception to the warrant requirement within
sections 62A-12-231 to -232. We disagree, and
conclude that a search incident to protective
custody, just as a search incident to a lawful arrest,
is allowed under the Constitution. See State v.
Brown, 853 P 2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992).
*4 H 12 Statutory interpretation is a question of law
and we accord no deference to the legal conclusions
of the tnal court but review them for correctness.
See Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36,H 17,
977 P2d 1201. In interpreting statutes, our
"primary goal is to give effect to the legislature's
intent in light of the purpose the statute was meant
to achieve." Evans v. State 963 P 2d 177, 184 (Utah
1998). "We therefore look first to the statute's plam
language." Id. We interpret a statute to grant an
agency M'such implied powers as are reasonably
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necessary to etfectuate its express powers or
duties ' Bennion v. ANR Production Co., 819 P 2d
343, 350 (Utah 1991).
[5] H 13 The legislature has clearly authorized "any
peace officer to take
[an] individual into
custody" so the individual can be transported to a
mental health authority to be involuntarily
committed if certain requirements are met. Utah
Code Ann. § 62A-12-232(l)(b). These requirements
include a certification by a licensed physician stating
that "because of his mental illness, [the individual
being committed] is likely to injure himself or others
if not immediately restrained." Utah Code Ann. §
62A-12- 232(1 )(a)(u). From our review of the
record, it is apparent that these requirements were
met. Defendant was actmg in a manner that could
have easily led to the serious injury of himself or
others. See id. Dr. Weber and the other witnesses,
including Defendant's mother, were concerned for
their own and Defendant's safety These facts
indicate that it was proper for Dr. Weber to request
that the police place Defendant mi protective
custody. See Utah Code Ann. § 62A-12-232(1).
[6] U 14 The plain language of the statute indicates a
concern for the safety of both the individual being
taken into custody and those the statute refers to as
"others." Accordingly, we agree with the trial court
that there is an implied authorization to conduct a
search incident to taking an individual into custody
pursuant to sections 62A-12-231 to -232. Without
such implied authorization to conduct a search, a
"peace officer" could not effectuate the legislative
intent of preserving the safety of the public or the
individual being taken into custody. Therefore, we
conclude that, pursuant to the statute, a peace officer
is authorized to conduct a search under sections
62A-12-231 to-232.
[7] % 15 We recognize that the "Fourth Amendment
prohibits all unreasonable searches and seizures "
Brown, 853 P.2d at 855 (citing Kan v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, 88 S.Ct. 507, 512, 19
L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)). "Warrandess searches are per
se unreasonable unless undertaken pursuant to a
recognized exception to the warrant requirement."
Id. Just as a search incident to a lawful arrest is
constitutionally permissible, so too is a search
incident to being taken into protective custody "The
core inquiry in a Fourth Amendment analysis is
'whether a person has a reasonable expectation of
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privacy in the area searched.
Id. (quoting United
States v. Bilanzich, 111 F.2d 292, 296 (7th
Cir.1985)). A person being placed in civil protective
custody can expect to be searched the same as an
individual who is placed in criminal arrest custody.
Indeed, a protective custody search of a mentally ill
individual may be more warranted given the greater
likelihood that they could injure themselves or
others with a concealed weapon. We thus conclude
that the searches in this case did not violate the
Fourth
Amendment
and
are,
therefore,
constitutional.
*5 [8] H 16 Furthermore, this statutorily authorized
search is not limited in scope to a simple weapons
pat-down. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26, 88
S.Ct. 1868, 1882, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). In a civil
protective custody search, the purpose is to protect
not only the peace officer but also the mentally ill
individual and others. Although Defendant correctly
asserts that any implied exception to the warrant
requirement
is
"limited
by
constitutional
protections," there was no violation of such
protections in this case. Accordingly, the searches
performed in this case were proper. Such a result is
not only consistent with the legislature's "intent in
light of the purpose the statute was meant to
achieve," Evans, 963 P.2d at 184, but is also
consistent with other case law. See,
e.g.,
Washington v. Dempsey, 88 Wash.App. 918, 947
P.2d 265 (1997); Washington v. Lowrimore, 67
Wash.App. 949, 841 P.2d 779 (1992). [FN4]
U 17 We therefore affirm the trial court's denial of
Defendant*s Motion to Suppress evidence obtained
from the searches incident to taking Defendant into
protective custody.

H 18 WE CONCUR: NORMAN H. JACKSON,
Presiding Judge, and JUDITH M. BILLINGS,
Associate Presiding Judge.
FN1. We cite to the most recent version of Utah
Code Ann § 62A-I2- 232 as there have been no
relevant changes in this section since the searches
at issue.
FN2. Lynn Yeates is also a deputy for the Box
Elder County Sheriffs Office. There is some
question as to whether Yeates was acting as a
peace officer or as a private citizen. However, we
assume Yeates was acting as a peace officer
because this is how the parties argued the case to
the trial court and on appeal.
FN3. Defendant refers to but engages in no
analysis of article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution. Therefore, we consider Defendant's
claims only under the Fourth Amendment. See City
of Orem v. Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994).
FN4. The Washington cases also discuss
emergency circumstances and community caretaker
doctrines as bases for conducting protective civil
custody searches. We find consideration of these
doctrines unnecessary. Therefore, we do not
address Defendant's arguments concerning the
emergency circumstances and community caretaker
exceptions to the warrant requirement.
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